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Water policy is an important topic on the agenda of 
the international community, and efficiency and equity 
in the allocation of water have emerged as important 
factors to be considered. Water pricing can be used to 
mitigate both the quantity and quality dimensions of 
water scarcity. This paper reviews partial equilibrium 
models and general equilibrium models that are relevant 
to irrigation water management issues. The most widely 
discussed issues in these models are water markets and 
water pricing. The interrelationships between economic, 
cultural, social, and political aspects that are related to 
water policy make it difficult to provide a comprehensive 
policy analysis. General equilibrium models of irrigation 
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water management allow incorporation of both the 
irrigation sector and the other sectors in the economy 
and analysis of policies affecting each of them and the 
interaction between them. In addition to being able to 
address sector and household specifications, production 
factors, time horizon, pricing policies, and institutions 
such as water markets, general equilibrium models allow 
the analysis of the impact of water policies on equity and 
poverty alleviation. The authors conclude that, although 
there has been a significant increase in efforts to analyze 
water related problems, analytical and empirical research 
in the field is still deficient and more effort is needed to 
address them.  
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1  Introduction 
Water has officially been recognized as a scarce resource by the international community 
since the 1992 Dublin Statements which clearly stated that water resources are not infinite and 
they are “vulnerable” (WMO, 2007). The Fourth Principle of 1992 Dublin Statements defines 
water as an economic good. On the other hand, the first principle of 1992 Rio Statements that 
supplemented the Fourth Dublin Principle implicitly suggests that water is a social good, 
therefore humans are entitled to at least certain levels of water especially under the 
responsibility of their respective governments (Dinar and Saleth, 2005).  
The scarcity of water has been on the agenda of policymakers and researchers in 
certain parts of the world, such as Middle East and Africa, for quite some time prior to the 
Dublin Statements. The first papers about the problems induced by water scarcity appeared as 
early as 1910s (Bontemps and Couture, 2002), but recognition of water scarcity as a global 
threat and its effects on both developing and developed countries became a widely discussed 
topic in the second half of 20
th century (e.g., Ciriacywantrup (1956, 1961); Smith (1951); 
Tolley and Hastings (1960)). In these early papers the central question was the allocation of 
water resources among different industries. Tolley and Hastings (1960), for example, follow a 
partial equilibrium analysis approach to determine the optimal allocation of water between 
energy production and irrigation. These studies do not consider any market based solution and 
they attempt to develop “planning routines” to allocate water in an economically efficient 
way.  
There was a significant expansion in irrigation activities throughout the 20th century 
(Schoengold and Zilberman, 2005). An important part of this increase has occurred in the 
post-WW II period. However, expansion was especially sizable in 1980s and 1990s (Tsur, et 
al. 2003). Although the estimates about the growth of irrigated land for the forthcoming 30 
years are moderate around a 0.4 percent per year (Tsur et. al., 2003), the potential for 
irrigation is still enormous with increase of more than 350 percent for Africa, 150 percent for 
Asia, and nearly 500 percent for South America (Schoengold and Zilberman, 2005). Such a 
huge potential has attracted the attention of scientists from different disciplines, mainly 
hydrologists and economists. If water had not been scarce, this would have been “good news” 
for the international community. However, as the irrigated area grows, the increase in demand 
for water for irrigation raises more questions about efficiency, equity and justice as it is well 
known that water resources around the globe are limited. Since the 1980s, the need for 
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institutions that would stimulate efficient use and equal and fair allocation of irrigation water 
has become a widely recognized concept by economists. 
Water scarcity discussions have brought to the front deeper “issues” such as the 
importance of irrigation for food security and public health as well as its contribution to the 
development of agriculture-dependent developing economies. Irrigation consumes from 50 
percent (Rosegrant et. al.. 2002) to 70 percent (Molle, 2002; WRI et. al. 2000) of global water 
resources. This share may even be as high as 90 percent in developing countries (Postel, 
2001). In the 1990s, attempts to resolve water use and allocation issues have focused on 
market based solutions. Research on the topic, however, has shed light on the fact that there is 
no universally applicable solution to all cases, though every country, region and even basin 
has its special characteristics that should be taken into account while designing policies.   
Consequently, market based suggestions became a controversial issue. Evidence for and 
against market based solutions has been put forward by many researchers (Molle, 2002; Ray, 
2002). There is a vast body of literature, mostly originating from economic analysis which 
discusses the necessity to set up an institutional framework to regulate the water markets.  
The controversy about the effects of water allocation mechanisms led to the 
development of economic models that seek analytical answers. Most of the analysis about the 
effects of water allocation mechanisms either support or criticize some kinds of institutional 
setup, and offer new ones. However it hasn't been possible to develop a general “recipe” due 
to the complexity of the issue. It is difficult, if not impossible, to disseminate the results 
obtained from descriptive and quantitative work, especially when the researcher intends to 
extend the analysis beyond supply and demand analysis and make macroeconomic, social and 
environmental policy analysis. Partial and general equilibrium models, which explore the 
relationship between water policy and other economic factors explicitly, turn out to be very 
suitable to asses the economic and social effects of water policy. Once water is accepted as an 
economic good as suggested by 1992 Dublin Statements, it can be easily added to these 
models as a factor of production. Further, since partial and general equilibrium models allow 
objective oriented specification of the economic phenomena, they are also suitable to make 
case specific analysis without losing the generality of the same analytical framework. 
The aim of this paper is to survey the literature on issues in the economics of water 
management, specifically in agricultural sector and to give an extended survey of the 
analytical tools, mainly partial and general equilibrium models developed in recent years. 
Surveying the irrigation water related issues through the analytical models that are 
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specifically developed to analyze these issues originally follows from Johansson et al (2000). 
Johansson (2000) surveys the literature until 1998. Then Johansson (2005) updates the former 
by including the work in the area published up to 2000.  In this paper, we attempt to 
contribute to the previous surveys in two ways. Firstly the time dimension is updated by 
covering work in the literature between 2000 and 2007. Secondly the computable general 
equilibrium models are covered in a more detailed and systematic manner.  
The paper is organized in two parts. The second part aims to give a brief discussion of 
the issues in the economics of water allocation. In this section pricing methods and 
institutional frameworks are analyzed. The third section focuses on the analytical models. 
Partial and general equilibrium models are surveyed in detail with their structure and main 
findings. The last section is reserved for concluding remarks.  
2  Allocation Mechanisms 
Increasing scarcity of water makes the issue of efficient allocation more important. On the 
other hand, since water is crucial for human life, equity is also a central concern in allocation. 
Economic efficiency is concerned with the amount of wealth that can be generated by a given 
resource base. Equity on the other hand is concerned with the distribution of the total wealth 
among the sectors and members of society. Equity objectives are particularly concerned with 
fairness of allocation across economically disparate groups. Hence these two criteria may or 
may not be consistent (Dinar et. al., 1997). 
Allocation mechanisms can be defined as sets of institutions and predefined rules 
that determine the quantity (and sometimes the quality) of water that individual (sometimes 
groups of) users are entitled to use. There are three frequently used institutional settings: 
Markets, public administration and user based administration. Any institutional setting 
allocates the water through some pricing mechanism.  
The allocation of water as an economic good is more complicated than the allocation 
of other economic goods as will be discussed in the paper, because water possesses unique 
characteristics that make its allocation complicated. Howe et. al. (1986) and Winpeeny (1994) 
give the criteria that should be considered for any allocation mechanism that leads to an 
optimal solution. These criteria are flexibility in the allocation of supplies, security of tenure 
for established users, real opportunity cost of providing the resource as paid by the users, 
predictability of the outcome of the allocation process,  equity of the allocation process, 
political and public acceptability, efficacy so that the form of allocation changes existing 
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undesirable situation and  administrative feasibility and sustainability. The next section 
discusses in detail the allocation mechanisms. 
2.1  Water Pricing 
The theoretical foundation of water pricing is similar to that of other goods. Pricing is 
considered to be superior to any other method in allocating the scarce resources among 
competing demands (Tsur et. al., 2003). Water pricing is considered as one of the many 
policy interventions that can be used to mitigate both quantity and quality dimensions of 
water scarcity and thus enhance efficient water use. Pricing of water plays two main roles. 
The first one is the financial role that is a mechanism for recovering the investment and 
operation and maintenance cost of the water system. Secondly, it has the economic role of 
signaling the scarcity value and the opportunity cost of water in order to guide allocation 
decisions both within and across water subsectors (Dinar and Mody, 2004; Dinar and Saleth, 
2005).  
Economic theory explores the conditions under which pricing works efficiently as an 
allocation tool. When prices are set in the absence of taxes, subsidies and other distortions, the 
price that leads to an allocation that maximizes net benefits is called first best or Pareto 
efficient price. The first best allocation is attained by setting a price equal to marginal cost of 
the resource. When prices are set under distortions such as information asymmetry, 
institutional limitations or political constraints the price leading to that allocation is termed 
the second best efficient price (Tsur and Dinar, 1997).   Pareto efficiency is regarded as “short 
run efficient” when the price optimization problem involves variable costs and “long run 
efficient” when fixed costs are included.  Prices are equalized to marginal cost only under 
perfectly competitive markets. However it is well known that no such market exits in real life. 
For the specific case of water, a set of market failures exist, such as externalities (Roe and 
Diao, 2000), recharge, asymmetric information (Tsur, 2000), large fixed costs and declining 
average cost of delivery (Tsur et. al., 2003). Evidently different pricing methods will have 
different political, social and economic consequences. Hence the choice is not only based on 
efficiency criteria.  
Water pricing systems have two different yet interrelated aspects. Firstly, the 
institutional framework under which the prices will be determined should be defined 
explicitly. This is because although pricing and recovery of irrigation water costs are 
important policy objectives, they have to be implemented within the local institutional, 
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political and social constraints, given that higher prices can raise political tension, especially 
where the revenues generated are not reused for the benefit of the farmers (Dinar and Mody, 
2004). Secondly the unit of price should be set. The former is likely to be determined in 
political processes while the latter is rather a technical question. However, overall efficiency 
or fairness of the pricing system will be determined by the joint effect of these two parts. 
Although pricing may be a useful tool, it is not always easy to implement and raising prices 
can sometimes have the effect of increasing overall water use. Secondly financial cost 
recovery for irrigation provision is gaining more widespread acceptance, though such cost 
recovery is not always based on economic pricing principles.  (Dinar and Mody, 2004)   
Pricing systems are generally classified as volumetric and non-volumetric. The former 
relates the price with volume of water used while the latter sets prices independent of the 
volume of water.  Tsur et al (2004) provide guidelines about what to expect from various 
water pricing schemes for irrigation water. 
2.1.1  Volumetric Pricing 
In volumetric methods the price of water is set per volume of water used. Thus, this method 
requires measurement of water consumption. A central water agency equipped with 
appropriate infrastructure to set the price, to monitor the water consumption and to collect the 
fees is necessary for volumetric pricing. Thus, implementation costs of volumetric pricing are 
generally high (Johansson et. al., 2002).  
Marginal cost pricing is one of the most cited methods in the literature. Accordingly, 
the price of water is equalized to the cost of producing an extra unit of water (Tsur and Dinar, 
1997). However the concept of cost is a bit ambiguous for water. In economic terms the real 
cost of water covers operation and maintenance costs, capital costs, opportunity costs, costs of 
economic and environmental externalities. Supply cost includes the first two of these. Supply 
cost together with economic externalities and opportunity costs constitute the economic cost. 
Lastly economic costs and environmental externalities add up to full cost (Rogers et. al., 
2002). In most cases, only supply costs are taken into account in pricing. However, the other 
cost components are much higher than the supply cost (Rogers et. al.. 1998; Johansson et. al., 
2002).  Limiting the pricing merely to supply cost is partly due to the difficulty in measuring 
other cost components and partly because of the political choices.  
In the absence of implementation costs, i.e. full cost equals to supply cost; marginal 
cost pricing is optimal in terms of efficiency. However, when this assumption is not satisfied 
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it is obvious that marginal cost pricing will not be able to attain first best solution and thus the 
price level obtained by ignoring the other cost components may not yield efficient allocation 
of water (Rogers et. al., 1998; Tsur and Dinar, 1997).  Thus a two part tariff pricing which 
would be composed of by a fixed admission fee and the marginal cost of supply can at least 
converge to an efficient allocation. Here the fixed amount can be considered as a 
compensation for the unobserved cost components. Further, for irrigation projects for which 
the marginal supply cost is below the average supply cost at the produced level of water, fixed 
part of tariff compensate the difference between marginal and average cost.   
Marginal cost pricing can be criticized for not taking equity concerns into account. A 
more equitable pricing system can be obtained by introducing a tiered pricing or two-part 
tariff. In tiered pricing different prices are set for different consumption levels. The charged 
price increases as the consumption increases. In this way different income groups can be 
addressed with different prices. However, it is obvious that this benefit comes at the cost of 
complicating the implementation costs (Johansson et. al., 2002).  
Bar-Shira et. al. (2000) estimated farmers’ demand for irrigation water in 185 Israel 
agricultural communities under increasing block-rate tariffs and empirically assessed its effect 
on aggregate demand and inter-farm allocation efficiency. Block rate pricing is different form 
marginal cost pricing in that it tries to induce water use reduction without burdening farmers 
with the full cost that simple marginal cost pricing would entail. In contrast, an increasing 
price schedule allows imposing the high, socially optimal price at the margin while 
maintaining a lower average price, thus keeping small farms in business. They found that, 
switching from a single to a block price regime yielded a 7% reduction in average water use 
while maintaining the same average price. Based on their simulations they estimated that the 
switch to block prices would result in a loss of approximately 1% of agricultural output due to 
inter-farm allocation inefficiencies.  
Brill et al (1997) in their case study of Hasharon region in Israel compared different 
policy options to allocate water in response to a reduced supply. Among their conclusions are 
that, average cost pricing with quota reductions results in administratively inefficient pricing 
and allocation, water markets cannot be remedy in the absence of well defined property rights 
and the solutions to the problem are hindered by high transaction costs. Tiered prices, on the 
other hand, lead to a ‘second best solution’ while passive trading would lead to Pareto 
efficient allocations. 
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2.1.2  Non-Volumetric Pricing 
An important deficiency of volumetric pricing is the difficulty of monitoring the actual 
amount of water consumed. This difficulty can be overcome only by implementation of 
measurement accessories such as water meters. However installation and maintenance of 
these accessories are relatively expensive and can be economically infeasible for most cases. 
Bos and Walters (1990) state that an important proportion of farmers throughout the world 
operate under non-volumetric pricing (Johansson, 2002).   
Most common non-volumetric method of pricing is per area pricing (Bos and Walters, 
1990). In per area pricing, users are charged according to the area irrigated. Charged price 
generally depends on the crop choice, season and irrigation method (Johansson, 2002). This 
method is easy to implement and administer (Tsur and Dinar, 1997). The method only 
requires collection of data about the farm size and crop choice which is likely to be available 
in most cases. Since per area prices are fixed costs for farmers, it is not likely to determine 
effectively the amount of water demanded. This is likely to bring about an inefficient 
allocation of water. On the other hand per area pricing will affect the crop choice of farmers 
given that price changes according to crop choice.  
Another group of non-volumetric pricing method is input or output based methods. 
These methods adapt a more indirect approach to measure the water consumption and are 
used when water consumption information is unavailable, unreliable or very expensive to 
collect.  In input based methods water related inputs are taxed. Output based methods charges 
water fees per output produced. These methods can attain only a second best allocation since 
“… the output fee and the zero price of water will distort decisions regarding input and 
output away from the first-best outcome achieved under the marginal pricing rule. The 
presence of implementation costs constitutes another source of deviation from a first-best 
allocation” (Tsur and Dinar, 1997:259). Deviation of these methods from efficient allocation 
depends on the implementation costs (Tsur and Dinar, 1997) and relationship between water 
consumption and production, i.e. productivity of water. If water productivity is high then 
these methods will attain a solution closer to first best allocation while if it is low, since 
output produced or inputs used will be a bad proxy of water consumption, they will deviate 
from efficient allocation more.  
In the absence of implementation costs non-volumetric pricing will almost always be 
inferior to volumetric pricing since the former will result in a second best solution while the 
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latter will reach a first best allocation. However implementation prevents volumetric pricing 
to achieve a first best allocation. Thus, depending on the case specific factors, non-volumetric 
methods may produce higher welfare compared to volumetric methods. 
There is a vast of literature analyzing the effects of implementing water pricing 
methods to ration water. For most countries these policies have failed to perform well, mostly 
due to faulty approaches and inappropriate institutions that have their roots in complicated 
political and economic environments (Dinar and Saleth, 2005). Ray (2002) got evidence from 
a study of the Mula Canal in India that farmers do respond to price induced water scarcity but 
water price policy and/or a system of tradable water rights are not the most effective ways to 
increase irrigation efficiencies. Maskey and Weber (1998) form a field study in Nepal on the 
possibility of introducing cost recovery irrigation fees.  They concluded that farmers under 
both government- and self-run irrigation systems are in a position to pay the Operation and 
Maintenance (O&M) cost. However, charging capital as well as O&M costs is found to be 
difficult to justify. These conclusions were made from both a comparative analysis and the 
marginal value product (MVP) approach.  
Ortega et al (1998) simulated the behaviors of farmers and their response to different 
water pricing scenarios on water demand, farmers' income and the revenue collected by the 
government agency. This was done for irrigation districts in Spain. Results showed that the 
effects of alternative pricing policies for irrigation water are strongly dependent on regional, 
structural and institutional conditions and that changing policies produce distinct 
consequences within the same region and water district. Thus, equivalent water charges would 
create widespread effects on water savings, farm income and collected government revenue 
across regions and districts.  
Latinopoulos (2005) considers different case studies of irrigated agriculture in Greece 
as they relate to water management. The study applied a Contingent Valuation Method and a 
Hedonic pricing method in an effort to find the value of irrigation water. The study draws the 
conclusions that the value of irrigation water as estimated by the water users is low because it 
relates to its use component. From the case studies it has also been concluded that the 
application of the principle of full cost recovery produces negative social impacts, it is also 
not an efficient management tool when implemented on its own.  
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2.2  Institutional Frameworks 
The effects of different pricing methods cannot be considered independently from the 
institutional setup.  The feasibility and efficiency of a pricing method can vary greatly from 
one case to another. The institutional framework determines the rules and regulations that 
economics agents are subject to. In other words, the institutional framework determines the 
constraints that the economic agents should take into consideration. Hence the issues about 
pricing methods –in fact any water related issue – cannot be understood without a proper 
description of institutional framework. In this section we will briefly discuss the institutional 
setup that relates to irrigation water management.   
2.2.1  Water Markets 
Markets are considered to be the most efficient way of allocating scarce resources by 
economic theory (Coarse, 1960). However this conclusion depends on restrictive 
assumptions. Economic theory legitimizes the public intervention to the allocation of 
resources in cases where the competitive markets cannot function. The failure of markets is a 
well-known fact in economic theory (Bator, 1958; Randall, 1983). Many different aspects of 
these failures are analyzed by various researchers (Stiglitz, 2002). Public good nature of 
water, implementation costs of large irrigation projects, incomplete information about the 
scarcity and availability, externalities, scarcity, returns to scale, equity concerns are among 
the most important reasons of market failures. (Johansson, 2000) 
Provision of goods and services can be characterized by the excludability and 
subtractability (Easter, 1997). Excludability implies the possibility of excluding specific 
agents from consuming the good while subtractability refers to the fact that consumption of 
the good or service by one agent leads to subtractions from the consumptions of other agents.  
Though water is both excludable and subtractable good, provision of services are not always 
so. Especially large irrigation projects that cover large number of farm plots, exclusion is 
quite difficult and once the irrigation infrastructure is built the service is enjoyed by all agents 
in the region without causing any subtraction. Thus, an important caveat about the public 
good nature of the water is that, the right to use is not directly related to water but rather to the 
provision of water. However these two properties about the infrastructure cause an important 
problem directly in the consumption of water. Although irrigation services are not 
subtractable, water itself is. Amount of water used effects the supply for the others users 
(Livingston, 1993). Overuse of public goods due to the ignorance of the users about the 
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others’ interest in the pursuit their self-interest is a well-known fact in economics (Hardin, 
1968). Accordingly, overuse of public goods makes the sustainability of the public good 
impossible. The very same problem is observed in the case of water. The public good nature 
of irrigation infrastructure causes markets to fail to provide irrigation services. Public control 
is among the most popular solutions to the problem. However, coverage of the “public” 
concept is rather case specific. It refers to government in some cases and to some kind of user 
associations for others (Schoengold and Zilberman, 2005). 
Failure of markets in provision of irrigation services can also be due to high 
implementation costs of large irrigation projects. The costs are not only limited to the building 
costs but also includes political, physical and institutional environment (Tsur et.al., 2003). In 
most cases irrigation infrastructure is not economically feasible for the private sector. Public 
provision is among the most mentioned solutions. Tsur (2000) gives a detailed analysis of the 
effect of implementation cost on efficiency.  
Incomplete information about the scarcity and availability of water is another 
underlying problem. Asymmetric information is also an important reason of market failure. 
Asymmetric information comes on the scene in various ways. Most prominent reasons of 
asymmetric information are due to the nature of supply of water. Water users do not have 
exact information about the quality, quantity and timing of supply, since supply of water is 
determined by climatic conditions.  Further, water exists in “discrete chunks” and is 
“naturally concentrated” in common pools or streams. That is to say the transportation or in 
general the implementation problems “naturally” exist in the case of water markets. Lastly, 
the consumption of water is not mutually exclusive among users.  Amount of water used 
effects the supply for the others users (Livingston, 1993). Tsur (2000) offers an output based 
pricing to overcome the difficulties of asymmetric information. A more general analysis of 
regulation under asymmetric information can be found in Laffont and Tirole (2003) 
(Johansson, 2002). 
Another underlying reason of market failure in the provision of water is the existence 
of negative and positive externalities. Externality is a cost or benefit due to an economic 
activity which is enjoyed (for positive externalities) or paid (for negative externalities) by the 
third parties. A good of which consumption by an economic agent brings about externalities 
for the other agents can be allocated efficiently in a market, if and only if the externalities are 
priced appropriately. However, a competitive market without the existence of public 
intervention is incapable of pricing these externalities.  
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Water production technologies bring about increasing returns to scale since per unit 
cost of water provision is inversely related to the amount of water used. Consequently 
marginal cost of production will always be less than the average cost and the supplier will 
have an incentive to supply more water. Increasing returns cause the emergence of natural 
monopolies and hinders the market mechanism.  
As mentioned above water supply is determined by the nature and it fluctuates 
according to the climatic conditions. Under scarcity the defined water rights will not be 
tradable since they will not represent anything at all.  Thus, supply side problems can prevent 
competitive markets to operate.  
Another impediment of water markets is the concerns about equity in the allocation of 
water. In other words, the social cost of efficient allocation is not taken into account by the 
market mechanisms. Equity concerns can be formulated by the effect of water allocation 
mechanisms on the income distribution. Tsur and Dinar (1995) argue that most pricing 
mechanisms have little effect on income distribution. Another aspect of equity discussions 
relates to the internalization of externalities. For example, irrigation is likely to bring about 
lower food prices by increasing productivity of other production factors such as water.  These 
low food prices are enjoyed by the rest of the economy. However markets do not take this 
externality into account. Equity concerns however, require that this externality is priced 
appropriately by the market mechanisms.   
Lastly any market mechanism to allocate water needs some kind of central agency. 
Such organizations generally cause inefficiency per se due to the problem of “political 
economy of neglect” which states that “… if agencies who fail to provide the necessary 
upkeep to their irrigation system are bailed out by a donor agency, there will be a lower 
incentive for them to provide efficient levels of maintenance.” (Schoengold and Zilberman, 
2005:20). 
In evaluating different sets institutional arrangements, market pricing in the absence of 
impediments constitutes a benchmark. Any market solution to the water pricing problem 
deviates from market solutions with the introduction of externalities, both positive and 
negative, transportation costs and difficulties in defining the entitlement rights. In such cases 
central regulation and government intervention is inevitable (Easter et. al., 1997). 
The options for the systems of water management are only limited by the diversity of 
irrigation systems. The key characteristics of these systems are imposed by the managerial 
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responsibilities, exercised control over water allocation, and the locus of the organizational 
control (i.e. top-down or down-top control) as well as the agents involved in irrigation. 
Managerial responsibilities of the system bring about considerable benefits by sustaining 
coordination of demand and supply while it requires substantial costs for information 
collecting and processing activities. System control is important to assure that rules of 
allocation are not violated by the agents. However, adequate control end in significant costs 
spent in monitoring and enforcement processes. Agents involved in the allocation system can 
be farmers, managers and government agencies. The involvement of these agents is likely to 
determine the extent which the system deviates from the competitive market benchmark. Too 
much involvement by government is likely to increase the inefficiency, while too little of it 
makes the system vulnerable to the market failures (Roumasset, 1997). 
Water markets critically depend on three pillars: Well defined property rights (Curie, 
1985), public information of supply and demand (Curie, 1985; Tsur, 2000) and physical 
possibility of trade (Roumasset, 1997).  
In practice the subject of trade is water rights (Roumasset, 1997). Operation of water 
markets, thus, critically depends on the definition of ownership rights (Schoengold and 
Zilberman, 2005). The structure of these rights is the driving force of the incentives and 
disincentives that make the market operational.  
The value of water should be separable from the value of other goods or assets such as 
land (Lee and Jouravlev, 1998). Among many others Curie (1985) defines the necessary 
conditions for a market to operate as well defined property rights, public information on the 
supply and demand and physical possibility of trade. Johansson (2000) extends this list in 
accordance with the special characteristics of water. In most parts of the world water rights 
are embedded in the land rights and the existence of a water market requires separation of 
these two rights (Roumasset, 1997). 
A management organization is also necessary to implement the transactions while the 
existence of infrastructure to transfer the water itself is also critical. This necessity implies 
some kind of public intervention in the market system. The size of investment necessary to 
allocate water and complex issue of the measurement of its usage make the establishment of a 
managing organization inevitable (Johansson, 2003). 
The allocation system should allow internalization of externalities. Otherwise a market 
system will operate inefficiently (Coarse, 1960). Internalization of externalities is generally 
  13 
  14
attained by markets under full information. Thus a central agency that will enforce this 
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Figure 1: Essential relationships between different factors concerning water markets. 
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Effective resolution mechanisms are necessary to solve the conflicts between water 
rights and equity concerns such as social goals (Roumasset, 1997; Johansson, 2003). These 
mechanisms generally consist of well-defined water rights by legislative bodies and well-
established social goals by political processes.  
Public information of supply and demand is another important issue in efficient 
operation of water markets. Tsur (2000) shows that in the absence of symmetric information, 
efficient allocation of water may not be attained by competitive markets.  
Lastly, physical possibility of trade is in the core of all. Transfer of water from some 
region to other requires appropriate infrastructure. Most of the time, the establishment of this 
infrastructure needs extensive investments which require enormous financial resources.  
It is easy to follow the fact that components that are required to operate water markets 
efficiently are not independent. A setting that cures an obstacle can be the cause of another 
one. Figure 1, shows the essential relationships between different factors that affect efficiency 
of market system. 
There have been a number of attempts in the literature to study on the applicability of 
water markets. In an attempt to examine the potential benefits of water markets as policy tool 
for addressing water quality problems of irrigated agriculture, Weinberg et al (1993) in their 
study on California concluded a 30 percent drainage reduction goal is achievable within a 
water market. There is potential therefore for a water transfer that could benefit both 
agriculture and urban sectors. Armitage et al (1999) surveyed how the establishment of 
tradable water rights in two irrigation districts in South Africa could be of benefit to society. 
The first area was the Lower Orange river where water is so scarce that production depends 
entirely on irrigation. It was seen that water rights moved to farmers who have achieved the 
highest estimated return per unit of water applied. The second observation was that water 
rights moved from potentially lower valued users with the potential to grow wine grapes and 
raisin grapes, to potentially higher valued users with the potential to grow table grapes. 
Buyers had larger amounts of undeveloped arable land, highlighting the efficiency advantage 
of market trades of bringing undeveloped arable land into production. The second area was 
the Nkwaleni valley where water is also scarce with production depending entirely on 
irrigation but there has been no trading of water rights.  It was observed that there were no 
willing sellers of water rights. This may attributed to the fact that surveyed farmers in the 
Nkwaleni Valley were generally found to be using their full water-rights allocation in their 
farming operations, and capital investment in irrigated land may have inhibited the sale of 
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water rights from this land. Irrigators may also have preferred to retain excess water for water 
supply security.  
Gardner et al (1968) studied irrigation water transfer in an area in Utah. The transfer 
policy and the water supply were the explanatory variables that accounted for most of the 
variation in the rental price of water. Making water available for rent was an important factor 
in reducing an important area of risk by inducing farmers to alter their cropping patterns. The 
efficient farmers could potentially produce high value, high water using crops, others would 
save it in order to rent it out. Statistically significant differences between the predicted rental 
prices under different allocative policies provided strong evidence that transfer freedom is 
very important to efficient allocation of resources. Backeberg (2006) evaluated the changes 
that have occurred in South Africa pertaining to user charges for cost recovery; market 
pricing, enabling market trades for water reallocation, and the process for transformation of 
WUAs. The conclusions pertaining to water markets were that water licenses were considered 
to be insecure.  
2.2.2  Public Administration 
Public administration is prevalent in large scale irrigation (Schoengold and Zilberman, 2005). 
Deficiencies in water markets call for public intervention. In the ideal case, public 
administration of water resources seeks to optimize social welfare by taking into account the 
market failure. Other water services are characterized by economies of scale, such as the large 
role of the public sector in its development and management being more essential than it is for 
other goods that can be handled efficiently in a market framework (Dinar et. al., 1997). Some 
water services are public goods, that is, their provision to one individual does not eliminate 
other individuals from using it. Non-excludability could then result in under-investment, mis-
allocation of the resource, and negative externality effects among the potential users, leading 
irrigation projects whereby, the average cost decreases as more units are produced. This may 
create monopolistic power and socially inefficient allocation, leading to market failures.  
Water projects are usually associated with large investment; most capital markets do 
not have the capacity to finance such huge investments over the necessary time period. 
Because of the range of market failures and the large volume of capital needed for water 
projects, a significant share of water-related infrastructure investments is conducted by the 
public sector. Therefore the need for huge funding which can be covered in very long run, as 
well as underdeveloped financial institutions, and possibility of political intervention makes 
these investments undesirable for private sector.  
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Public administration may be needed to regulate the consumption to achieve socially 
optimal allocation when the consumption of a user adversely effects the consumption of 
others (negative externality). Public administration can ensure that required investments are 
made to avoid specific problems such as infrastructures to prevent floods, storage facilities 
that will be used in times of scarcity or that will maintain quality of water.  
Lastly, water is a strategic resource in sustaining life and it is important for national 
security and regional development. Thus protection of water resources is a public good which 
calls for involvement of government (World Bank, 1993). Public administration is thus 
desirable especially in some specific cases.  
 Thus public administration of water resources can meet the conditions for “equity, 
sovereignty, and an overwhelming concern with satisfying the water itself and water services 
as public good.  Ideally, these objectives and the efficiency objectives produced by marginal 
cost pricing would be met simultaneously”. (Dinar et. al.. 1997:10) 
Along with these virtues, public administration has well-known deficiencies (Dinar et. 
al.. 1997; Schoengold and Zilberman, 2005; Spiller and Savedoff, 1999). Firstly government 
financing of irrigation services disrupts the relationship between price and cost. That is to say, 
water is not priced on the basis of its marginal cost, which in turn causes inefficient 
allocation. Spiller and Savedoff (1999) call this fact as “government opportunism”, and points 
out the fact that government can keep prices lower or subsidies higher than the socially 
optimal level to keep their citizens happy (Schoengold and Zilberman, 2005). Secondly, 
inefficiency of publicly administrated irrigation systems is a common observation (Tsur et. 
al., 2003; Çakmak, 2003; Dinar, et. al., 1997, Schoengold and Zilberman, 2005).  Meinzen-
Dick et. al., (1996) argue that an underlying reason for such failures is the lack of incentives 
for conservation and efficient use of water under public administration (Dinar et. al., 1997). 
Furthermore, Schoengold and Zilberman (2005) show that public administration may end up 
over-investing in new infrastructure and neglecting the maintenance of old ones. This fact can 
be explained by the theory of “political economy of neglect” (Schoengold and Zilberman, 
2005). 
Lastly, Yoder (1980) draws attention to the fact that most of the water management 
agencies have local or sectoral responsibilities which brings about ignorance about the general 
state of water resources. Consequently, these agencies lack the incentive for developing 
integrated projects (Dinar et. al. 1997).  
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2.2.3  User Based Administration 
User based administration (or Water User Associations - WUA) lies somewhere in between a 
market system and a public administration.  WUAs have become more and more prevalent in 
the last two decades (Dinar et. al.. 1997, Schoengold and Zilberman, 2005). A WUA is an 
administrative body formed by the beneficiaries of the water resources. This body can be 
formed in many different ways. Government officials may or may not be represented in the 
management board. It can be sector based or region based. It can be formed by the 
beneficiaries from a single sector or from various sectors. It may or may not be controlled by 
some superior official or unofficial central agency. Beneficiaries can be represented directly 
or indirectly. The association can be a monopolist, oligopolist or just one of the many 
suppliers. The body may aim to maximize its profits or it can be a non-profit organization. 
Coward (1986) states that effectiveness of WUAs is crucially dependent on well 
defined user rights which constitute the basis of relationships between users (Dinar et. al., 
1997).   Collective actions among users are, thus, impossible without the existence of property 
rights on water. Many case studies show that WUAs operate more efficiently (Schoengold 
and Zilberman, 2005). Easter (2000), further they argue that when WUAs are required to 
purchase the water they use, this gives them an incentive to conserve and use water efficiently 
(Schoengold and Zilberman, 2005). Meinzen-Dick (1997) states that long term farmer 
participation is the key success indicator for WUAs (Johansson et. al., 2002) 
WUAs have many advantages over pure market or public administration systems. First 
of all, they are more flexible since the rules of allocation and pricing are set by the users 
themselves. Thus, WUAs can rapidly adapt their rules when conditions change. This 
flexibility follows not only from ability to adjust rules but also from being local institutions. 
They have more information about the local conditions. (Dinar, et. al., 1997). Further locality 
enables more successful resolution of conflicts among members (Dinar et. al.. 1997). WUAs 
are more successful in increasing water supply (Dinar, 1997) and maintenance investments 
(Kloezen  et. al. (1997) cited in Johansson, 2002), since the members of WUAs directly 
benefit from these activities. Further, WUAs bear lesser costs in gathering information on 
local resources. WUAs have administrative feasibility, sustainability and political 
acceptability. Easter and Welsch (1986) and Wade (1987) state that WUAs decrease the 
implementation costs significantly (Johansson et. al., 2002).  
WUAs may also have important disadvantages. Ruttan (1998) states that institutional 
design is problematic (Johansson et. al., 2002). Besides, conservation depends on 
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consciousness of board members and beneficiaries. Another problem is the necessity of a 
transparent institutional structure, which may not always be available.  Further, local user-
based institutions can be limited in their effectiveness for inter-sectoral allocation of water 
because they do not include all sectors of users (Dinar et. al.. 1997). Lastly, WUAs may fail to 
sustain equity (Dinar et. al.. 1997). Dayton and Johnston, 2000 show that WUAs may not be 
equitable since wealthier landholders are able to push for a higher share of total water. Thus, 
some level of equality in land-holdings is necessary for the success of WUA based 
management (Schoengold and Zilberman, 2005).  
2.3  Irrigation and Poverty 
Equity considerations in the allocation of water in agriculture have led to the development of 
literature on the impacts of water allocation on poverty alleviation. Poverty is an outcome of 
complex interactions of resources such as land and water that poor people largely depend on, 
compared to the non-poor and other resources, institutions, actions and policies and their 
ultimate outcome. Poverty is a multidimensional concept that by definition extends from low 
levels of income and consumption to lack of education and poor health.  It also covers social 
aspects such as hopelessness, uncertainty, susceptibility, isolation, and gender disparities. The 
basic needs vary across time and space; therefore poverty lines also vary depending upon the 
level of socio-economic development, social norms and values within regions in a country or 
across countries (Hussain et. al., 2006).   
Recent studies on poverty and irrigation make a distinction between different forms of 
poverty. They distinguish between chronic or permanent poverty and transient or temporary 
poverty. Chronic poverty is associated with lack of assets (both physical and human), low 
level of productivity, disadvantageous demographic characteristics (such as large families and 
high dependency ratios), and location in more remote and backward areas. Transient poverty, 
which is also related to lack of assets, is more typically associated with households’ inability 
to insure themselves against fluctuations due to either external factors such as price levels, 
climate change or job availability or household-level shocks such as serious illness or death of 
family members (Hussain, 2007). 
It would be naive to perceive that all rural poverty problems could be solved through 
improving the poor’s access to water alone. Water is one of the most important factors in 
poverty equation with its wide effects. (Husain and Hanjira, 2003). Irrigation has been proven 
to be a poverty reduction tool for the 21
St Century. This is supported by the fact that greatest 
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reduction in poverty has occurred in the regions that have had the greatest proportion of 
irrigated land. There are evidences from East Asia, Pacific, North Africa, and Middle East. 
This is in contrast to Africa where only around 3% of cropland is irrigated and the region has 
experienced very little reduction in poverty in the 1990s (Lipton et. al., 2003). As a 
production input in agriculture, irrigation water is an important socio-economic ‘‘good’’, with 
a positive role in poverty alleviation but it can also become a socio-economic ‘‘bad’’ when it 
leads to problems such as waterborne diseases (malaria, schistosomiasis), and land 
degradation including water-logging and salinity, water pollution and associated destruction 
of living beings and natural ecosystems, i.e. negative externalities associated with irrigation 
(Hussain and Hanjra, 2004). 
 
Table 1 : Poverty Incidence and irrigation in developing regions. 
$1–a–day poverty (1998) 
 








% Irrigated area 





East Asia and Pacific  278  15 -33  20 
Latin America h Asia  78  16 22  12 
Sub-Saharan Africa and the 
Caribbean 
5  0.04 -44  27 
North Africa and the middle East  522  39 10  6 
Sub –Saharan Africa  291  44 34  3 
Source: Poverty figures from World Bank (2000, 2001), Irrigated land from FAO Statistical 
Database 
 
Lipton et al (2003), Hussain and Hanjia (2003) and Hussain and Hanjra (2004) laid out 
a conceptual framework for analyzing the transmission mechanism between irrigation and 
poverty. Irrigation has direct impacts on poverty via increases in output levels and 
employment and further second round effects on poverty via output, employment and prices. 
Irrigated land usually encourages farmers to adopt or increase their use of fertilizers, 
pesticides, improved seeds and other agricultural inputs and provides the stimulus for further 
research into improved plants and technology that lead to increased output, employment and 
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incomes with possible further reductions in prices. The longer run effects on poverty are also 
via non-farm rural output and employment through expenditures on non-food products and 
services. Irrigation also has socio-economic impacts as negative health effects associated with 
increase in the incidence of water related diseases such as schistomiasis and malaria, 
displacement of large numbers of people and negative environmental effects of dam 
construction. Positive effects could be in the form of improved nutritional outcomes through 
the availability of increased and more stable food supplies and sometimes-cleaner water. 
Three pathways have also been identified in the literature as the mechanisms through 
which the poverty reducing impacts of irrigation follow. Firstly it is the micro-pathway which 
manifests itself through increasing returns to physical, human and social capital of the poor 
households (productivity pathway). Secondly there is the meso-pathway which operates 
through integrating the poor into factor-product and knowledge/information markets (market 
participation pathway). Thirdly, there is the macro-pathway which works through improving 
national growth rates and creating second-generation positive externalities (economic growth 
pathway) (Hussain and Hanjra, 2003)). These three pathways are interlinked in their 
functions. 
Using evidence from the Uda Walawe Left Bank Irrigation Scheme (WLB) in Sri 
Lanka,  Hussain and Hanjra (2003) concluded that irrigation water does matter for poverty 
alleviation, unequal land distribution is associated with inequitable distribution  of agricultural 
–water benefits , benefits  of irrigation and its  antipoverty impact are greatest in settings with 
low land inequality, rural poverty alleviation requires that agricultural/water irrigation 
development be targeted at poor communities/areas/localities and that effective poverty 
alleviation in irrigated agriculture also necessitates broad and targeted interventions in both 
hardware and software dimensions that entails building partnerships between actors and 
stakeholders.  
Vaughan (1997) studied the potential of irrigation development in South Africa in 
having positive impacts on rural poverty. The paper concluded that although irrigation 
development had been a mechanism that was historically used by the apartheid state to realize 
its political and economic agendas, it offered a range of possibilities for poverty alleviation.  
The paper recommended that clear policy principles were essential along with relevant 
information to guide the provincial departments of agriculture and the local authorities.  
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Figure 2 :  Irrigation water and Poverty linkages 
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Source: Based on Hussain and Hanjra (2003). 
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Letsoalo et al. (2005) in their study sought ways of reducing poverty in South Africa 
while at the same time implementing policies that address water scarcity problems The results 
of the study showed  varied impacts of these policies on poverty.  
Hussain  et al. (2006) using cases of areas in Pakistan concluded that  access to 
irrigation through small-scale irrigation schemes must be encouraged to increase crop 
production in order to alleviate poverty.  
Huang et al. (2005) on the study of irrigation and poverty in China found evidence that 
irrigation has a strong impact on income and poverty. They also found that irrigation helps to 
reduce income inequality. Irrigation investment in rural China appears to be an investment 
that can lead to both growth and equity in some provinces. 
3  Water in Economics: Quantitative Models 
Models form the core of analytical tools in economics. Verbal, graphical, mathematical or 
computational methods are used to formulate conceptual simplifications of real life 
phenomena (Howitt, 2005).  These simplifications help the researcher to avoid unnecessary 
complications of real life that are out of the scope of research and focus on the aspects that are 
of the interest.  
The same approach is followed in the literature for the economic analysis of water 
allocation. For this purpose mainly two families of economic models can be used: Partial and 
general equilibrium models.  As the name suggests, both approaches depend on the 
assumption of equilibrium and the difference between them is the level of assumed 
equilibrium. Partial equilibrium models consider the effects of water policy on a specific 
market, by ignoring the linkages between whole economy and that specific sector. This 
assumption is viable if the market under investigation is relatively small. For example a water 
market can be analyzed by partial equilibrium analysis, especially at basin level since effects 
of changes at basin level will have limited effect on the whole economy. On the other hand, 
general equilibrium models may be more suitable to analyze the effects of different pricing 
schemes on income distribution among different social groups.  
Both partial and general equilibrium models can be formulated by different analytical 
tools. Algebraic expression of a model is just one of these tools among others. Further, 
different analytical tools are used simultaneously to formulate the model more precisely. 
Howitt (2005) defines analytical tools that are used simultaneously in the modern neoclassical 
modeling. Firstly, simple verbal models are used to define the qualitative properties of a 
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paradigm. A simple verbal expression is a necessary condition in understanding the complex 
structures of mathematical models. Secondly graphical models are extensively used in the 
literature to introduce the relationships between functions and equilibriums. Although 
graphical models are generally limited to two or three dimensions they are very useful in 
formulating the relationships between different variables. Lastly, algebraic methods are used 
to extend the analysis to multi-dimension cases. In economic literature, models are generally 
identified with algebraic models for the last 5 decades (Howitt, 2005). 
Algebraic models are the main tools that economists use in analyzing the issues 
discussed in previous sections. Pricing methods and institutional framework determines the 
structure of the economic models related to the irrigation water management.  In this section 
we will survey algebraic economic models designed to analyze the water policy with special 
emphasis on general equilibrium models.
2  
3.1  Partial Equilibrium Models 
Partial equilibrium models are of special interest to the researchers of irrigation water 
management, since for most cases water constitutes a small part of agricultural input markets 
due to lack of appropriate pricing and institutional setup. Hence by using partial equilibrium 
models, one can make inference about the possible outcomes of different institutional setups 
and pricing strategies. In this section we will survey the partial equilibrium models developed 
to analyze irrigation water management related issues.  
 
3.1.1  Background 
The focus of partial equilibrium models is on the equilibrium conditions of a market for one 
good/sector which is a part of the overall economy. By doing so, partial equilibrium models 
assume that the prices are fixed in the other markets. Marshall (1920) emphasize that when 
the share of the good under study is a small proportion of consumer’s total budget, income 
effects will be minimized which implies that the market under study can be assumed to be 
independent from the macroeconomic relationships that affect the whole economy. Secondly, 
interaction between prices of different goods can also be assumed to be minimal. Under these 
                                                 
2 There are also models that attempt to figure out the optimal water allocation. An example of such models is 
Ghahraman.and Sepaskhah (2004) where authors use water production functions to model the relationship 
between irrigation and yield. They optimize “irrigation water allocation for single- and multi-cropping 
patterns in a field”. However, the model does not have an economic module that relates allocation to prices. 
Another example is Smout and Gorantiwar (2005) where authors use “simulation – optimization techniques 
to allocate land and water resources optimally to different crops in a heterogeneous irrigation scheme with 
limited water under rotational water supply.” (Simout and Gorantiwar, 2005:3).    
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two assumptions a market for a single good is independent from the rest of the economy. That 
is to say, changes in the dynamics of the specific market can be assumed to have no or limited 
effects on the rest of the economy.  
In partial equilibrium models, supply and demand of the commodity under analysis is 
modeled in detail. Demand is generally found by maximizing some kind of objective function 
under pertinent constraints. For water markets, farmers are consumers while water authorities 
are suppliers. Thus the demand is be found by maximizing either the profits or surplus of 
producers. An alternative and frequently applied method is using a biophysical farm model to 
determine crop and time specific water demand. The second method requires more detailed 
data about yields, water requirements, irrigation areas and crops produced. Under the 
assumption of a functional relationship between inputs and output, the first method is rather 
simple and water demand can be obtained from the first order conditions of the optimization 
problem. 
The supply side, on the other hand, is more difficult to model due to the uncertainty. 
Water supply is largely dependant on unpredictable weather conditions. One way to overcome 
this difficulty is to use outputs from hydrological models or historical data to determine the 
level of future availability. In this way water availability is made exogenous to the model 
variables and thus supply side shocks are given exogenously to the model. If the water 
availability can be assumed to be non-binding then uncertainty problem can be ignored. In 
this case, supply side can be determined in the same way as the other economic goods, i.e. by 
maximizing the profits of suppliers under an appropriate structural assumption (monopolistic, 
oligopolistic or competitive) about the water market. However, in most cases such an 
assumption is unrealistic and generally water supply functions are calibrated to historical data 
and effects of changes in water supply are analyzed exogenously.  
3.1.2  Recent Work 
Johansson et. al., (2002) and Johansson (2005) give an extended survey of partial equilibrium 
models. The former covers the models until 1998 while the latter extends up to 2004. 
Jonhsson et. al. (2002) describes the general framework of partial equilibrium models and 
surveys the deviations of the models from the standard theoretical framework. Johnsson 
(2005), on the other hand, focus is on the taxonomy of the models according to their 
mathematical approaches and surveys the contribution of different models to different 
modeling methods. In this section we will give a survey of recent work aiming to model the 
water markets by using partial equilibrium analysis. We will focus on the contributions of 
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these works to the theoretical framework of the models, as well as the details of their 
application.  
Vaux and Howitt (1984) are cited as the pioneer work in implementation of partial 
equilibrium models in analyzing the water markets. They use a simple static non-linear 
specification of water markets to analyze the effects of regional water transfers. Following 
this pioneer work many similar models are applied to different parts of the world to analyze 
the effects and potentials of water markets. To count a few Gonzalez-Romero and Rubio 
(1993), Becker (1995) and Horbulyk and Lo (1998) can be given as examples (Garrido, 
2004).  
More complicated models have appeared in the literature as these models became 
solvable with the help of more able computer systems. Hamilton et al. (1989) and Michelson 
and Young (1993) have incorporated the institutional arrangements into their models. 
Weinberg et al. (1993), Dinar and Letey (1991) and Booker and Young (1994) introduced 
biophysical variables to the analysis of water markets. Dinar and Wolf (1994) used a game 
theory framework to simulate international water markets. Brill, Hochman, and Zilberman 
(1997) use a partial equilibrium model to analyze the performance of different pricing 
mechanisms.  
Ray (2002) uses a partial equilibrium model to analyze the effect of different price 
levels of water on crop pattern throughout the year. His aim is to test the effects of increasing 
water prices and facilitating water markets. He concludes that “water price policy and/or a 
system of tradable water rights are not the most effective ways to increase irrigation 
efficiencies because water prices cannot be feasibly raised to the point where they can affect 
water demand and use.” (Ray, 2002:13)  
Garrido (2004)  criticizes the former programming models for ignoring the 
implications of droughts for the water markets, the transaction costs related to water trade, 
administrative units that play a key role in water markets, and the water market conditions 
that determine market equilibrium conditions. He has developed an integrated model to 
analyze the effects of water markets on Spanish agriculture. The modeling approach used by 
Garrido (2004) incorporates the geographical extent to which water markets need to be 
limited, the impact of transaction costs and the effect of asymmetric drought impacts affecting 
various water districts at the regional level. The model consists of three modules, a farm 
model that maximizes the farm surplus to determine the district-based water demand, an intra-
district water markets model which maximizes the aggregate surplus of district to determine 
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the water supply within the regions and an inter-district water market that determines the 
water exchanges among different regions.  
Garrido (2004) applies the model to four districts in Guadalquilvir River Basin of 
Spain for five crops. The main conclusion of the simulations is that the number of participants 
and transactions in the water markets within the Spanish agricultural sector is likely to be low 
and thus granting the basin agency some responsibility in running and supervising market 
transactions is advisable. Further Garrido (2004) concludes that markets at the regional level 
are more effective and efficient. Different structures of irrigation districts such as crop pattern 
are at the heart of this efficiency gain and allow all parties participating in the trade to be 
better off.  
One important problem about linear programming models has been their inability to 
calibrate to actual behavior by adding constraints or risk terms (Howitt, 2005). As an alternative 
positive mathematical programming (PMP) is offered by Howitt  (1995). PMP method uses the 
actual data on crops and livestock to derive a quadratic cost function and thus calibrate the model 
without adding unrealistic constraints (Howitt, 2005). PMP approach assumes that unit cost of 
production rise as the amount of production increases. Thus the ratio of marginal costs to marginal 
revenues can be used to determine the optimal crop pattern. (Hall, 2001). Hence “the PMP cost 
function calibrates exactly to observed values of production output, and factors usage. Second, 
PMP adds flexibility to the profit function by relaxing the restrictive linear cost assumption. A 
third advantage is that PMP does not require large datasets to as many inductive methods do, to 
provide enough price variability.” (Medellin-Azaura, 2006:13).  
PMP method has become the standard calibration method in recent work. Hall (2001) 
gives a partial equilibrium model based on positive mathematical programming (PMP) 
approach to develop a quadratic programming model of Murray-Darling Basin of Australia. 
The model developed by Hall (2001) is based on a linear programming model, namely 
Integrated Murray-Murrumbidgee Modeling System of the Australian Bureau of Agricultural 
and Resource Economics (ABARE). A detailed description of the model is given in Hall et. 
al.. (1994). Model of Hall et. al.. (1994) is a spatial equilibrium model that uses partial 
equilibrium model framework to link the region level models of water supply and demand 
while the irrigation regions included in the model covers half of the irrigated areas in 
Australia. Hall (2001) re-formulates the model by using the PMP approach and compares the 
results of linear model and quadratic model. He concludes that both models have superiorities 
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to each other in different cases. Quadratic model performs better for simple cases while the 
linear model outruns the quadratic model when a more detailed modeling is needed.  
Another example of PMP based partial equilibrium analysis is given by Marion et. al 
(2001). Their model uses an agricultural sector model, namely Statewide Water and 
Agricultural Production Model (SWAP) as an integrated part of the UC Davis Statewide 
Economic-Engineering Water Model (CALVIN). CALVIN is an economic-engineering 
optimization model. It attempts to represent the major storage and conveyance facilities which 
are inter-tied. The model gives estimates on groundwater supply, environmental water 
requirements, and agricultural and urban demands for water.  Furthermore, the model is 
designed to suggest how this system might be operated based on economic criteria while 
meeting physical and environmental requirements. 
CALVIN model uses SWAP model to estimate the economic valuation of urban and 
agricultural water demand. SWAP is built on the basis of a former partial equilibrium model 
of agriculture developed by Brown et. al. (1996), namely the Central Valley Production 
Model (CVPM). SWAP extends CVPM by covering more regions, using market prices 
instead of calibrated PMP costs, allowing yield to vary according to a quadratic production 
function, by fixing regional output prices and by making monthly analysis instead of a yearly 
one.  
Like most of the partial equilibrium models, SWAP operates by maximizing economic 
returns subject to resource, production, and policy constraints under different supply 
conditions such as droughts. The objective function of SWAP is each region’s total net 
returns from agricultural production with the appropriate production and resource constraints 
on water and land.  The model can identify specific monthly water allocations assessing the 
willingness to pay of different agricultural water users for a reliable water supply by using 
shadow values as willingness-to-pay (Howitt et. al., 2001). 
A recent example of PMP based partial equilibrium models are given by He et. al.. 
(2006). They use static partial equilibrium models to analyze the effects of water policy in 
Morocco and Egypt. The models are developed by Doukkali (2002) and Siam (2001) for 
Morocco and Egypt, respectively. Both models maximize producer surplus from agricultural 
based commodities under various resource, technical, and policy constraints to find the water 
demand functions. He et. al. (2006) assumes that water supply is constant over time. They 
calibrate the base model with standard PMP. The crop productions are modeled using 
Leontieff type production functions. For Egypt 25 crops and 5 livestock products are covered 
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by the model while for Morocco 50 crops and 7 livestock products are incorporated. Egyptian 
model consists of 8 regions while Moroccan model has 5 irrigation zones in 6 regions. 
Using multi-model approaches have started in the last five years. These models use 
partial equilibrium models as a module to represent the economic side of the water allocation 
problem, while they rely on other types of models such as biophysical or hydrological models 
to introduce heterogeneity among farmers or uncertainty. Sunding et al (2002), for example, 
represents a multi-model approach. The economic part of the model, namely Californian 
Agricultural Resource Model (CARM), depends on partial equilibrium concept and “provides 
various measures of economic impacts, including impacts of supply cuts on producers’ 
surplus, producers’ revenue, production, employment, and irrigated acreage” (Sunding and 
Chong, 2006:242). The CARM objective function maximizes the sum of producer and 
consumer surplus from California agricultural crop production The model also takes 
uncertainty into account and derives differences between short–run and long-run. 
Heterogeneity among producers is incorporated into the model by introducing farms at 
different sizes. Lastly barriers to trade such as the prior appropriation system and riparian 
rights systems are also modeled (Sunding and Chong 2006). Sunding et. al. (2002) combine 
CARM with an agro-economic model, which supplies water productivity data, and with a 
detailed rationing model which measure the immediate impacts. (Sunding and Chong 2006). 
Perret and Tauchain (2002) also use a multi-model approach to evaluate the effects of 
different irrigation pricing and distribution schemes in South Africa. Their model consists of 
five modules: Cost, farmer, irrigation scheme, crop and charging system modules. These 
modules interact to determine a number of micro-economic, socio-economic and technical 
variables to assess economic performance issues as well as hydraulic performance and water 
scarcity issues. The output is calculated by cost and crop modules Hence water demand is 
determined by these modules. Water supply on the other hand is determined by schemes 
module that lists different water availability options. Perret and Tauchain (2002) use this 
module to make simulations for Dingleydale - New Forest irrigation scheme. 
Another example of multi-model approach is the WATERSIM Model developed by 
International Water Management Institute (IWMI) and International Food Policy Research 
Institute (IFPRI). WATERSIM models water and food production and the environmental 
issues at the global scale (Fraiture, 2007). It is an integrated model that combines different 
aspects of water management issue. The main focus of the model is on the effect of the 
changes in food demand on water demand at the global scale. There are two models in the 
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WATERSIM, one for the agricultural market and the other for the hydrological structure of 
the basins. The former determines the output prices and water demand while the latter 
determines the water supply.  
Medellin-Azaura (2006) provides a partial equilibrium model focused on irrigation. 
He uses a multi-region and multi-crop model to value water in Mexicali Valley of Colarado 
River Delta in Mexico. The model is calibrated with PMP. The model uses a relatively less 
restrictive production function, namely CES function, and a high level of disaggregation. 
Water demand is found by maximizing the profits of different groups of farmers. The model 
addresses the heterogeneity in production not only by covering different crops but also by 
introducing different farm groups. Main findings are as follows: The ratio of shadow value of 
water obtained from the model to actual water fee is between 2.7 to 5.9 and low-value crops 
and poor-land quality agricultural regions are the likely sellers of water under extreme 
scarcity conditions. 
Lastly, Tsur (2005) gives a rather interesting analysis of theoretical framework of 
partial equilibrium analysis of water markets. Tsur (2005) starts its analysis by stating that the 
demand for water is derived and it is closely related to seasonality as well as the quality. He 
uses both profit maximization and shadow price approaches to obtain the derived demand 
from a production function that takes the amount of water used in irrigation as an argument. 
Tsur (2005) introduces seasonality into his analysis by solving the input allocation model 
under sub-period water constraints. To construct the sub-period derived demands for water he 
finds the relationship between the shadow prices obtained from the constraints for every 
period and different levels of water use. He further introduces water quality issues by treating 
water at different quality as different inputs and obtaining different derived demands for each 
water type. Tsur (2005) does not give an application of his model. He uses graphical tools to 
analyze the effects of different pricing methods.  
3.2  General Equilibrium Models 
Partial equilibrium models cannot be used to make economy-wide inference and policy 
recommendations. However, in modeling the irrigation water, any change in environment, 
either policy or physical, is likely to affect the whole economy. One reason is the share of 
irrigation water in the total water use. The ratio is quite high as described above. Hence any 
shock is likely to have significant effects on macroeconomic variables. In order to analyze the 
macroeconomic effects of changes in water management policies a broader framework should 
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be used. The computable general equilibrium models are developed to illuminate the 
relationship between macroeconomic effects of irrigation water management. In this section 
we will survey these models in detail and supply a detailed tabulation of these models.  
3.2.1  Background 
The attempts to model an economic system as a whole go back to the classical economists. 
Classical economists such as Adam Smith, David Ricardo or John Stuart Mill were 
intrinsically oriented towards a general equilibrium concept (Arrow, 2005). However, they 
have failed to formulate a general equilibrium system analytically. Walrass (1874) was first to 
recognize the need for as many equations as variables to define an equilibrium for a complete 
analysis of an economic system (Arrow, 2005). General equilibrium theory has become the 
standard theoretical framework for the analysis of the economy, especially after a series of 
papers from Arrow, Debreu, Kuhn and McKenzie published in 1950s (Arrow, 1958; Arrow 
and Debreu, 1954; Debreu, 1952, 1956 and 1959; Kuhn, 1956; McKenzei, 1954, 1955 and 
1959). After these pioneering works, a vast of literature has appeared, and the theory of 
general equilibrium has been extensively developed by various researchers. This theoretical 
framework has evolved to applied models as early as 1930s. Frisch (1931 and 1933), 
Tinbergen (1937 and 1939) can be given as the examples of first applied general equilibrium 
models, though their approaches were different than that of today's researchers. In the post 
war period works of Klein (1952) and Klein and Goldberger (1955) were examples of short-
term implementation of general equilibrium models. Scarf (1967) and Scarf and Hansen 
(1973) has developed the algorithms that facilitated most of the following applied work 
(Arrow, 2005).   
The theoretical framework has evolved to computable general equilibrium models 
(CGE) (a.k.a. applied general equilibrium models (AGE)). Johansen (1960) is accepted as the 
first model in the literature that is consistent with the general equilibrium theory. Johansen's 
(1960) model is a disaggregated numerical model aimed at identifying the sectoral 
contributions to economic growth in Norway. The model had a simple structure with 
important differences from the CGE models developed later (Bergman, 1990). In mid-1970s 
the ORANI model was developed in the University of Melbourne within the context of 
IMPACT project. ORANI was aiming to model the sectoral allocation of capital and labor as 
well as the outputs (Bergman, 1990). ORANI is more detailed and improves the solution 
techniques offered in Johansen (1960) (Dixon, 1975). 
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The first major instances of CGE models, close to the current understanding of the 
term,  were developed to analyze the developing countries, as a result of the work initiated by 
World Bank in the early 1970s (Bergman, 1990). Adelman and Robinson’s (1978) model is 
the leading model in literature (de Maio et. al., 1999). The aim of the model was mainly 
concerned with the relationship between income distribution and economic growth. Adelman 
and Robinson (1978) solved the model directly in terms of the levels of endogenous variables. 
This is the most significant difference of their approach from the previous work (Bergman, 
1982).  
In 1980s and 1990s CGE modeling has been one of the most attractive fields of 
research for economists. Almost all topics in economics from financial issues to 
environmental policies have been the topic of CGE models. Berck et al. (1991) was first to 
analyze water policy in a CGE context. Their focus was on the impacts of water transfer from 
agriculture to other sectors in the San Jaoquin Valley, USA (Tiwari and Dinar, 2001) as well 
as giving a comparison of partial and general equilibrium models (Johansson et. al., 2002). 
Following this work, a number of models are developed by various researchers.  
Johansson (2000 and 2005) gives a detailed survey of the work done until 2000. In this 
section, we will make a survey of the recent work on computable general equilibrium models 
focusing on modeling water pricing and especially in water markets.
3   
3.2.2  Recent Work 
In recent years, the increase in the consciousness of the international community about water 
issues is also reflected in the efforts spent to develop CGE models to analyze the effects of 
different policy options. In this part of our study, we will focus on the recent research that 
uses CGE models to analyze the water issues. A special emphasis is put on the pricing of 
irrigation water and water markets. The details about the production, consumption structures 
of the models are available in Table 2.  
The early papers, namely Seung et. al. (2000) and Goodman (2000) came up with 
county level models aiming to go deep inside water policy. Seung et al. (2000) use a county 
level dynamic CGE model to estimate the welfare gains of reallocating water from agriculture 
to recreational use for the Stillwater National Wildlife Refuge in Nevada (Beritella, 2005b). 
                                                 
3 We have excluded the papers that are somehow related to CGE modeling but do not present a CGE model. An 
example is Hassan (2003) which “traces the chain of value addition between primary production and final 
use” (Hassan, 2003) by using a quasi input-output approach to analyze the economy wide benefits of 
irrigation. He maps the chain of production linkages starting from the end or final product (e.g. refined sugar) 
to primary sector activity (e.g. cane plantation). 
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The model introduces a recreation demand module that is consistent with the general 
equilibrium framework. Water is modeled as a scarce source that should either be allocated to 
agriculture or recreational areas. Water is an input both for agricultural production and 
production of recreational areas. The utility function of the households includes recreation 
consumption as well as the other commodities. Hence, a “market for recreation” determines 
the price of “recreational areas” and these sectors compete for water resources. The 
simulation results conclude that transferring water from agriculture to recreation areas 
decreases regional GDP significantly.  
Goodman (2000), on the other hand, uses a CGE model to shows that temporary water 
transfers cost less than establishment of new infrastructure for the Arkansas River Basin. 
Goodman (2000) models the water as a storable production factor. He introduces a separate 
module which supplies the water availability levels for the CGE model.  
The water CGE literature also consists of excessively large models, too. An example is 
Peterson et. al.. (2004) who developed a 48 sector/20 region CGE model, based on the TERM 
model which is in turn based on ORANI model mentioned above. The model analyzes the 
effect of water trade on the effects of water scarcity and reports that allowing both intra- and 
interregional water trade among irrigators substantially lessens the impact of reducing water 
availability on gross regional product. The model is further refined by Dywer et. al., (2005) 
extends the analysis of Peterson et al. (2004) to investigate the effects of expanding trade to 
include both irrigators and urban water users. They found that water trade compensates the 
losses from water reductions.  
Tirado, et. al.. (2004) also illustrate the gains from voluntary water rights exchange 
mainly between the agriculture and urban sectors for Balearic Islands of Spain. With their 15 
sector CGE model, they show that agricultural production is lower when there is a market for 
water rights than when there is not such a market. Tirado et. al. (2005) introduce Water 
Framework Directive to the same model, while Tirado et. al. (2006) analyze the effect of 
efficiency of irrigation on tourism sector and they conclude that water efficiency measures do 
not reduce economic pressures on water ecosystems. 
Another ORANI based (to be precise the ORANI-G version of Harrison and Pearson 
(1996)) large scale CGE model is given by Letsoalo et. al. (2005). They test the triple 
dividend hypothesis which states that the taxes on environment can simultaneously stimulate 
economic growth, poverty reduction and environmental protection. The latter two are direct 
effect of an environmental tax while the former follows from the increase in the government 
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revenue. By using a 65 sector/48 household CGE for South Africa they show that triple 
dividend is possible for water policy.  
Beritella  et. al. (2005a) develop GTAP-W, a large scale CGE model that extends 
GTAP Model of Hertel et. al. (1987). Their main contribution is the introduction of a water 
module to a very large trade model, namely GTAP. They relate water scarcity with 
international trade and analyze the possible effects of reductions in water availability on 
global trade. Their model consists of 17 sectors, 16 regions and 16 household types. In the 
model they consider both a non-market case and a market solution case. They conclude that 
welfare losses are substantially larger in the non-market situation. Beritella et. al. (2005b) 
introduce the tax policies to the model of Beritella et. al. (2005a). They conclude that water 
taxes reduce water use and lead to shifts in production, consumption, and international trade 
patterns. The countries that do not levy water taxes are also affected by the taxes levied by 
other countries. Lastly, effects of water tax on production and water tax on final consumption 
are different. Another extension to Beritella et. al. (2005a) is Beritella et. al.. (2006) who uses 
a the same CGE model to estimate the impacts of the Chinese North-South water transfer 
project on the economy of China and the rest of the world. They conclude that China will 
benefit from the project at the expense of the International trade and global GDP.  
Another international trade model is offered by Kohn (2003). Kohn uses a Heckscher-
Ohlin framework to illustrate the effects of international water trade. The focus is on the 
Middle East, which is assumed to be one of the important water conflict areas. They model 
water both as a produced good in which one of the countries have a comparative advantage 
and as an input used to produce the other good. Both countries are better off with international 
trade. Consequently he offers water markets as an alternative to warfare. Kohn (2003) utilized 
the Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson general equilibrium framework to examine the economic 
efficiency of international trade in water as a means to mitigate water scarcity when water is 
both an input and output among the trading countries (Bucconsufo, 2005; Beritella et. al, 
2006). 
Briand (2004) developed a static CGE model to estimate the effects of a water price 
policy on production and employment in Senegal (Velazquez, 2007). She models the drinking 
water as a consumer good and primary water as a production factor which is also a produced 
by government. Her modeling attempt turns out to be incomplete. However, she is the first to 
introduce the competition between irrigation and drinking water to a CGE model.  
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Finoff (2004) introduces a bio-economic model based on general equilibrium approach 
to analyze the effects of both stochastic changes in salinity levels and initial shock to 
population levels of species on the ecological and economic variables. The model is 
interesting since it is the first model that integrates biological aspects of water policy with a 
CGE framework. Agents in the model are energy maximizers. Water determines the 
salinization levels and biomass production in the model.  
The Boccanfuso et al. (2005) extend the EXTER model of Decaluwé et al. (2001) 
which is an integrated multi-household (IMH) model. IMH models consist of large numbers 
of households by using household survey data to assess the effects of different policies on 
households in a detailed way.  Boccanfuso et. al. (2005) is the first example of this approach 
focusing on water issues. They investigate the distributional impact of privatization of the 
water utility and isolate winners and losers of privatization in Senegal. They model water 
market with two water utilities that sell water to water suppliers with an exogenously 
determined price. They conclude that price changes have different general equilibrium effects 
and winners and losers depend on these effects.  
Diao  et. al. (2005) present a detailed intertemporal CGE model for Morocco. 88 
activity types produce 49 final products in 20 regions. Their simulations show that water 
markets are likely to increase the agricultural output significantly in Morocco.   
Roe et. al. (2005) represent a combined model that takes both micro and macro aspects 
of policy interventions for improving irrigation water allocation in a n analytical CGE 
framework for analyzing irrigation related issues in Morocco. The model allows for analysis 
of both top-down (trade reform) and bottom-up (farm water assignments and the possibility of 
water trading) linkages since it consists of both macro and micro aspects of the problem. The 
model consists of two modules, a farm level model and a macro level model. The farm level 
model solves the monthly irrigation water allocation for crops. Prices are exogenous for the 
farm model. On the other hand The CGE model accounts for the whole economy and prices 
are determined endogenously. CGE model consists of  82 production activities producing 44 
commodities by employing 8 primary input in the agricultural sector. There are further 6 non-
agricultural sectors spanning the rest of the economy. The country is separated into 20 
perimeters. There are 5 types of households and the public sector at the demand side. 
International trade is differentiated among EU and rest of the world (Roe et. al., 2005). Roe 
et. al. concludes that trade reform (top-bottom or macro to micro linkage) has a higher effect 
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compared to water reform(bottom-up or micro to macro linkage). They also conclude that the 
sequencing of reforms is also important in determining the final effect.  
Diao  et. al (2008) is another extension of Dio et. al. (2005) and analyzes the 
groundwater resources in a general equilibrium framework. The structure of model is very 
similar to that of Dio et. al. (2005) except that ground water is modeled as an input for the 
agricultural production. The model also consists of urban water demand. The model 
concludes that grounds water is important in lessening the severity of the economic and 
climatic shocks.  
Smajgl et. al. (2005) integrate theoretically agent-based modeling with a CGE model. 
They show that while CGE models allow the quantification of trade-offs between economic 
sectors, catchments and values, agent-based models make land-use decisions spatially 
explicit. The production side of the CGE is modeled in the standard way. However demand 
follows from the agent based model. In the demand side decisions cumulate in a preference 
based non-market utility function and a costs and revenues based economic payoff function. 
They conclude that integrated models are likely to perform better.  
Lastly, Velazquez et. al. (2007) develop the models of Cardenete and Sancho (2003) 
and André et. al. (2005) to assess the impact of various of tax policies. They aim to analyze 
the effects of an increase in the price of the water delivered to the agriculture sector on the 
efficiency of the water consumption and the possible reallocation of water to the remaining 
sectors for Andalusia, Spain. Water is modeled as a production factor subject to taxes. The 
model is the first model that compares effects of different taxation schemes with the water 
market option. They conclude that although the tax policy does not yield significant water 
saving in the agricultural sector, a more efficient and more rational reallocation of water is 
achieved.  
Table 2: Recent CGE Models related to water issues 
Model Background  Further  Analysis  Aim  Modeling  approach  Production Function  Utility Function 
Seung et. al., 2000       
Comparing the effects of water 
transfer from agriculture to 
recreative areas 
County level dynamic CGE 
model with a recreation 
demand module 
Cobb-Douglas with fixed ratio 
intermediate inputs  CES 
Goodman, 2000       
Comparing the effects of water 
storage increase and water 
transfers 
County level dynamic CGE 
model  CES CES 
Peterson et. al.,  2004 
ORANI (Dixon et. al.. 1982) 
;TERM Model (Horridge et. al., 
2003)  Dwyer, 2005; 
the long run effects of trade 
under reductions in water 
availability and short run 
reductions based on observed 
allocations  Large Scale,  standard CGE  Nested CES, 3 Level 
demand follows a linear 
system of expenditure 
Dwyer et. al., 2005 
extends the analysis of Peterson 
et al. (2004) to investigate the 
effects of expanding trade to 
include both irrigators and urban 
water users                
Tirado et. al., 2004    
Tirado  et. al.. 2005 
and 2006 
analyze the welfare gains 
associated with an improvement 
in the allocation of water rights 
through voluntary water 
exchanges (mainly between the 
agriculture and urban sectors).    
nested CES, 5 level for 
agriculture and 4 level for 
others Stone-Geary  function 
Tirado et. al., 2005  Tirado et. al., (2004) Tirado  et. al., 2006 
provide information on water 
management options under 
Water Framework Directive.          
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Model Background  Further  Analysis  Aim  Modeling  approach  Production Function  Utility Function 
Tirado et. al., 2006  Tirado et. al., (2004) Tirado  et. al., 2006 
explore the impact of increasing 
the technical efficiency of water 
use in the tourism sector.          
Kohn, 2003          
Heckscher - Ohlin - Samuelson 
model  Cobb-Douglas Simple  multiplicative 
Briand, 2004       
To estimate the production and 
employment impacts of water 
policy pricing on the 
development of both formal and 
informal water distribution 
segments.  Static CGE 
Nested CES, 3 Level for 
drinking water, 4 level for 
distribution, 5 level for 
agriculture 
Linear System of 
Expenditure 
Finoff, 2004       
effects stochastic changes in 
salinity levels and an initial 
shock to species-population 
levels on the ecological and 
economic variables  Bioeconomic Model  Agents are energy maximizers    
Boccanfuso  et. al., 
2005 
extends Decaluwe (2001) by 
introducing water utilities    
investigate on the distributional 
impact of privatization of the 
water utility and to isolate 
winners and losers of following 
privatization in Senegal  Integrated Multi-household   3 level nested CES  Cobb-Douglas 
Diao et. al., 2005  Diao and Roe 2000, 2003     
economy-wide gains from the 
allocation of surface irrigation 
water 
decentralized mechanism for 
achieving this result in a 
spatially heterogeneous 
environment.  Intertemporal CGE  Available upon request    
Roe et. al., 2005    
Analyzing the effects of top-
down and bottom-up reforms on 
irrigation water allocation.  
Combines a CGE model with a 
farm model 
Homogenous of degree one and 
non-increasing in inputs   
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Model Background  Further  Analysis  Aim  Modeling  approach  Production Function  Utility Function 
Diao et. al. 2008  Roe et.al. (2005)   
empirically evaluate the 
importance of conjunctive 
management in a general  
equilibrium setting 
Extends Diaa et. al 2005 to to 
include surface and GW as two 
"intermediate sectors".     
Beritella et. al., 2005a 
GTAP (Hertel, 1997); GTAP-E 
(Burniaux and Truong, 2002) 
Beritella  et. al., 
2005b, 2006 
role of water resources and 
water scarcity in the context of 
international trade  multi-region world CGE model 
8 level, nested CES function 
under Armington assumption 
3 level nested Cobb-Douglas 
under Armington assumption 
Beritella et. al., 2005b      
to assess a series of water tax 
policies          
Beritella et. al., 2006      
to estimate the impacts of the 
North-South water transfer 
project on the economy of China 
and the rest of the world.          
Smajgl et. al., 2005       
Show that while CGEs allow the 
quantification of trade-offs 
between economic  sectors, 
catchments and values, agent-
based models make land-use 
decisions spatially explicit. 
combines a Computable 
General Equilibrium (CGE) 
model and an agent based 
model (ABM) for integrated 
policy impact assessment.  Nested CES, 5 Levels 
Supplied by agent based 
model. Decision making 
cumulates in a preference 
based non-market utility 
function and a costs and 
revenues based economic 
payoff function. 
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Letsoalo et. al.. 2005 
ORANI-G (Harrison and 
Pearson, 1996)    
to analyze the triple dividend of 
water consumption charges in 
South Africa: reduced water use, 
more rapid economic growth, 
and a more equal income 
distribution.  Static CGE 
Nested CES with an overall 
Leontieff structure under 
Armington assumption 
linear expenditure system 
under Armington assumption 
Velazquez, 2007 
Cardenete and 
Sancho, 2003; André et. al., 
2005    
to analyze the effects of an 
increase in the price of the water 
delivered to the agriculture 
sector on the efficiency of the 
water consumption and the 
possible reallocation of water to 
the remaining sectors.  Standard Static CGE 
Nested Cobb-Douglas, under 
Armington assumption  Cobb-Douglas 
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Table 2 (cont’d): Recent CGE Models related to water issues 
Model Investment  Factors  of  Production  Assumptions about Factors  Sectoral Detail  Household Detail 
Coverage and Regional 
Detail 
Seung et. al., 2000 
Endogenously determined 
dynamically by capital stock, 
sectoral profits and return rate  Labor, Capital, Land. 
Labor: perfectly across 
regions; partially mobile 
across sectors 
Capital: immobile 
Investable Funds: Perfect 
8 Sectors, 3 agricultural, 5 
Other including finance,  
3 Households: Low, middle, 
high income 
1 Region, North Nevada, 
USA 
Goodman, 2000 
Determined by capital growth 
and depreciation  Land, Labor, Capital, Water 
Labor: perfectly mobile, 
capital is sector specific land 
and water is usage specific, 
4 Sectors, irrigated and non-
irrigated agriculture, services 
and manufacturing  2 Rural and Urban 
South-Eastern Colorado, 
USA 
Peterson et. al.,  2004
Investment demand is 
determined exogenously  Land, Labor, Capital, Water 
Labor is fully mobile within 
regions, partially mobile 
among regions, Land and 
capital are mobile at varying 
degrees  48 Sectors  1 Type 
20 Regions in Sothern 
Murray Darling basin of 
Australia 
Dwyer et. al., 2005    
net gains are greatest, and the 
costs to industries and regions 
are generally more dissipated, 
when trade is unconstrained. 
When regions with relatively 
low levels of water 
consumption face shortfalls in 
water availability and trade 
with regions that use large 
volumes of water they have 
little effect on traded prices 
and quantities.             
Tirado et. al., 2004  Exogenous 
Labor, capital, land, water and 
seawater 
Labor is perfectly mobile 
Land and capital is mobile 
among agriculture sectors.  
10 Sectors, 3 agricultural 
(irrigated and non-irrigated, 
livestock), 2 water sectors: 
traditional and desalinization  1 Type Balearic  Islands,  Spain 
Tirado et. al., 2006                
water efficiency measures do 
not reduce economic 
pressures on water 
ecosystems. 
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Model Investment  Factors  of  Production  Assumptions about Factors  Sectoral Detail  Household Detail 
Coverage and Regional 
Detail 
Kohn, 2003  - Labor,  Water  - 
2 products, water and non-
water  - 
Middle East two countries 
simulation 
Briand, 2004  -  Primary water, Labor, Capital  - 
3 Sectors: Drinking water 
production, distribution and 
agriculture 
3 Types, Dakar, other urban, 
rural  Senegal, 3 regions 
Finoff, 2004          
5 Sectors including brine cyst 
harvesters, mining, 
agriculture, recreation, 
industry  1 type  Great Salt Lake ecosystem 
Boccanfuso  et. al., 
2005  Determined by agent savings 
Qualified and Unqualified 
Labor, Capital, Water  Labor is mobile  18 Sectors 
3,278 households modeled 
explicitly, no HH groups  Senegal, no regions 
Diao et. al., 2005    
Rural Labor, Urban Labor, 
Capital, and Land 
Labor is mobile within 
agriculture. Capital and Labor 
are mobile within regions 
among agricultural sectors, 
water is mobile within 
irrigation districts 
88 activities: 82 Agricultural, 
66 crops, 5 livestock, 11 
processing 
49 Products: 23 Agricultural 
2 types: Rural and 
agricultural  Morocco, 20 Regions 
Roe et. al., 2005    Labor, Capital, Land   
88 activities: 82 Agricultural, 
66 crops, 5 livestock, 11 
processing 
49 Products: 23 Agricultural  5 Household types  Morocco, 20 Regions 
Diao et. al., 2008     
71 Agricultural; 66 in crop 
production, captured spatially 
as irrigated and non-irrigated, 
33 crop production activities 
within the water  irrigation 
authority  
perimeters, of which, 21 are 
irrigated crop production and 
11 are rain-fed    Morocco, 21 Regions 
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Beritella  et. al., 
2005a 
Determined by savings and 
distributed to equalize the 
expected future rates of return 
for all regions  Capital, Labor , Land, Water 
Capital and labor are perfectly 
mobile domestically, 
immobile internationally. 
Land and natural resources are 
sector specific, Water is 
mobile within agricultural 
sectors 
17 Sectors 6 of which are 
related to agriculture 
includes a water distribution 
sector  17 Types, one for each region  16 Regions 
Model Investment  Factors  of  Production  Assumptions about Factors  Sectoral Detail  Household Detail 
Coverage and Regional 
Detail 
Beritella  et. al., 
2005b 
water taxes reduce water use, 
and lead to shifts in 
production, consumption, and 
international trade patterns. 
Countries that do not levy 
water taxes are affected by 
other countries’ taxes. A 
water tax on production 
would have different effects 
than would a water tax on 
final cons.                
Beritella et. al., 2006 
Project would stimulate 
China’s economy and 
increase welfare. The payback 
periods of different 
alternatives are between 1 and 
3 years. Benefits of additional 
water supply are positive. If 
the water transferred is 
allocated to industry and 
households the benefits are 
halved.                
Smajgl et. al., 2005                
Great Barrier Reef Region of 
Australia 
Letsoalo et. al.. 2005  Exogenous  Labor, Capital, Land 
The capital is assumed to be 
fixed, while the rate of return 
on capital is allowed to 
change. 
Labor supply is perfectly 
elastic. The supply of land is 
also assumed to be inelastic. 
27 Sectors,  
energy and water intensive 
sectors are further split into 39 
sectors  12 Income, 4 ethnic groups  South Africa 
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Velazquez, 2007  Exogenous  Labor, capital, land, water 
Capital supply is perfectly 
inelastic. 
In the labor market, there is a 
feedback between the real 
wage rate and the 
unemployment 
rate which represents rigidities 
in the labor market.  16 Sectors  1 Type  Andalusia, Spain 
 
  45  
Table 2 (cont’d): Recent CGE Models related to water issues 
Model  Time Dimension  Role of Water in the Model  International Trade  Contribution to literature  Main Findings 
Seung et. al., 2000 
Dynamic: Goods market adjust 
in the short run via prices, 
factors market adjust in the 
long run by factor mobility 
determines the land usage; very 
simple and indirect 
Perfect trade with ROW, 
Armington Specification 
1. Introduces integration of 
recreational demand with a CGE 
model and  explicitly models 
alternative use of water 
Using water for recreative areas 
instead of water decreases total 
welfare 
Goodman, 2000 
Dynamic: Goods market adjust 
in the short run via prices, 
factors market adjust in the 
long run by factor mobility 
Production factor, can be stored, 
water availability is modeled 
separately  Perfect trade with ROW 
Compares establishment of new 
infrastructure and reallocation 
The benefits from increased transfers 
is higher than 
those from increased storage 
Peterson et. al.,  2004  Static 
Production factor, supply is fixed 
exogenously 
Each regions is treated as a 
small open economy 
Introduces one of the most detailed 
regional model to analyze water 
policies 
allowing both intra- and interregional 
water trade among irrigators 
substantially lessens the impact of 
reducing water availability on gross 
regional product 
Dwyer et. al., 2005                
Tirado et. al., 2004  Static  Production factor. Supply is constant 
Small open economy, 
Armington Specification    
agricultural production is lower when 
there is a market for water rights than 
when there is not such a market, 
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Model  Time Dimension  Role of Water in the Model  International Trade  Contribution to literature  Main Findings 
Tirado et. al., 2005                
Tirado et. al., 2006                
Kohn, 2003  - tradable  good  Trade  Model 
Introduces Heckscher - Ohlin - 
Samuelson framework 
both countries are better off when 
fresh water is internationally traded 
Briand, 2004  Static 
Drinking water modeled as consumer 
good, primary water is prod. factor 
and produced by government 
Small open economy, 
Armington Specification 
Introduces drinking water 
distribution as a separate sector, 
analyzes drinking water vs. irrigation    
Finoff, 2004  Static Determines  salinization  and biomass  Small open economy, 
First model that links biomass 
equilibrium to water policies    
Boccanfuso et. al., 2005  Static 
Intermediate input. 
Two water utilities selling water or 
water suppliers. Price of water is 
exogenous,  
Small open economy, 
Armington Specification 
First implication of Integrated Muti-
Household approach to water 
modeling. 
Introduced stylized facts of the 
production behavior of the water 
sector 
Price changes have important general 
eqb. effects 
Households are biggest loser from 
privatization. 
Rural households lose more.  
  
Diao et. al., 2005  Static Production  factor 
Small open economy, 
Armington Specification    
Water markets are likely to increase 
the agricultural output significantly. 
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Model  Time Dimension  Role of Water in the Model  International Trade  Contribution to literature  Main Findings 
Roe et. al., 2005 
CGE is static, Farm level is 
intertemporal  Production factor  Small open economy 
Takes macro-micro linkages into 
account. Combines a farm model 
with a CGE model 
trade reform (top-bottmo or macro to 
micro linkage) has a higher effect 
compared to water reform(bottom-up 
or micro to macro linkage). They 
also conclude that the sequencing of 
reforms is also important in 
determining the final effect. 
Diao et. al., 2005  Static  Production factor  Small open economy 
Frist to analyze groundwater in a 
CGE framework 
GW has a critical role in mitigating 
the  
negative effects of these types of 
shocks 
Beritella et. al., 2005a  Static 
Water resources are non-market 
goods, water is a production factor. 
water is combined with the value-
added-energy nest and the 
intermediate inputs  Global trade model 
Uses GTAP to analyze water policy, 
introduces water module for GTAP 
Welfare losses are substantially 
larger in the non-market situation. 
Water-constrained agricultural 
producers lose, but unconstrained 
agricultural producers gain; industry 
gains as well. There are regional 
winners and losers from water supply 
constraints. 
Beritella et. al., 2005b                
Beritella et. al., 2006                
Smajgl et. al., 2005  Static 
water cycle is approximated on a 
catchments level. Crucial indicators 
for an integrated assessment are 
remaining water volumes in streams 
and in aquifers.    
Integrates a CGE model with an 
agent based which allows dynamics 
spatially explicit by introducing 
hydrological system and the 
ecological system. 
Integration of agent based model 
with CGE gives more reliable results. 
Letsoalo et. al.. 2005  Static  Production factor  Small open economy 
Analyzes the relationship between 
poverty issues and water policies 
combines poverty reduction with 
environmental management 
show that there can be a triple 
dividend of water policy, 
simultaneously reducing water 
scarcity, improving economic 
growth, and reducing poverty. 
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Velazquez, 2007  Static  A factor of which is subject to tax.  
Small open economy trading 
with ROW, Rest of Spain and 
Europe,  Comparison of taxation reallocation 
although the tax policy does not 
correspond to significant water 
saving in the agricultural sector, a 
more efficient and more rational 
reallocation of water is achieved.  
4  Conclusion 
The severity of the increase in the global environmental problems alerts for the likely water 
security in the 21
st century. International community officially accepted scarcity of water only 
recently. Governments all over the world state that they are well aware of necessity of 
implementing appropriate measures to cope with this scarcity. Since water is one of the main 
production factors in agriculture and agriculture demands a very high proportion of water 
through out the world this alert also has serious implications for food security. 
Efficiency in the allocation of water is offered as a remedy to increasing. However 
efficiency may require transfer of water usage rights from less efficient crops and regions to 
more efficient ones. At this point, equity has become a central concern in allocation since 
water is crucial for human life. Most frequently used institutional settings for allocating 
irrigation water are public administration and user based administrations. Water markets, 
which are advocated by many economists as a solution to efficient allocation problem, face 
difficulties during implementation. The allocation of water as an economic good is more 
complicated than the allocation of other economic goods because water possesses unique 
characteristics which in turn bring about externalities and market failures. Although markets 
have been considered to the most efficient mechanism to use in allocating scarce resources, 
water allocation has proved to be different. Water pricing is considered as the main policy 
tool that can be used to mitigate both quantity and quality dimensions of water scarcity and 
thus enhance efficient water use. The economic solution to the issue of water allocation may 
need some support in the form of institutions without which they may not work well.   
Recent developments in the literature have shown that the issue of equity in the 
allocation of irrigation water is linked to poverty alleviation. Irrigation has been proven to be 
a poverty reduction tool for the 21
st century. 
The modeling of water in partial equilibrium models can either be from the supply side 
or demand side. Demand is generally found by maximizing some of objective function, which 
could be either the profits or surplus of producers under certain constraints.  Biophysical farm 
models are another alternative that can be used to determine crop and time specific water 
demand, although they require more detailed data about yields, water requirements, irrigation 
areas and crops produced.  
Modeling the supply side is more complex due to the uncertainty because water 
supply is largely dependant on unpredictable weather conditions.  Outputs from hydrological 
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models or historical data can therefore be used to determine the level of future availability. In 
this way water availability is made exogenous to the model variables and thus supply side 
shocks are given exogenously to the model. If the water availability can be assumed to be 
non-binding then uncertainty problem can be ignored. 
Several policy issues have been addressed in Partial Equilibrium models. The widely 
researched areas have been the use of water markets and pricing in an effort to manage water 
scarcity. The results have been generally sector specific with water markets and pricing 
mechanisms bringing positive results in some areas and negative in others as discussed in 
section. Linear Programming models are arguably the most widely used Partial Equilibrium 
models in water management policy applications. Their problem however is their inability to 
calibrate to actual behavior by adding constraints or risk terms (Howitt, 2005).   
Other techniques in Partial Equilibrium modeling have been discussed in the literature. 
These include Positive Mathematical Programming (PMP), which uses  the actual data on crops 
and livestock to derive a quadratic cost function and thus calibrate the model without adding 
unrealistic constraints (Howitt, 2005).  Multi-model approaches use partial equilibrium models 
as a module to represent the economic side of the water allocation problem, while they rely on 
other types of models such as biophysical or hydrological models to introduce heterogeneity 
among farmers or uncertainty.  Their applications have been discussed in section 3.  Tsur 
(2005) developed a theoretical framework of partial equilibrium analysis of water markets. 
There is however no application of this model. 
CGE models on irrigation water management have different specifications of the 
production functions, utility functions, sectoral and household specifications, assumptions 
about factors and different time dimensions depending on the country or region under study. 
Recent CGE models have also emphasized on pricing of irrigation water and water markets 
just like the Partial Equilibrium models.   
Seung  et. al.. (2000) model water as an input in the agricultural sector and the 
recreational sector and conclude transferring water from agriculture to recreation areas 
decreases regional GDP significantly. Goodman (2000) on the other hand, shows that 
temporary water transfers cost less than establishment of new infrastructure. Water is modeled 
as a storable production factor. Diao et. al. (2005)’s simulations show that water markets are 
likely to increase the agricultural output significantly in Morocco.    
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Large water CGE models have been developed to address regional and international 
water trades for example Peterson et. al.. (2004)’s model analyzes the effect of water trade on 
the effects of water scarcity. They conclude that that allowing both intra- and interregional 
water trade among irrigators substantially lessens the impact of reducing water availability on 
gross regional product.  Dywer et. al., (2005) extends the analysis of Peterson et al. (2004) to 
investigate the effects of expanding trade to include both irrigators and urban water users. 
They found that water trade compensates the losses from water reductions. Beritella et. al.. 
(2005a) develop GTAP-W, a large scale CGE model that extends GTAP Model of Hertel et. 
al.. (1987). They conclude that welfare losses are substantially larger in the non-market 
situation. Beritella et. al.. (2005b) introduce the tax policies to the model of Beritella et. al.. 
(2005a). They conclude that water taxes reduce water use and lead to shifts in production, 
consumption, and international trade patterns. Countries that do not levy water taxes are also 
affected by the taxes levied by other countries.  Beritella et. al.. (2006) uses and estimates the 
impacts of the Chinese North-South water transfer project on the economy of China and the 
rest of the world. They conclude that China will benefit from the project at the expense of the 
International trade and global GDP.  Kohn (2003) uses a Heckscher-Ohlin framework to 
examine the economic efficiency of international trade in water as a means to mitigate water 
scarcity when water is both an input and output among the trading countries. Both countries 
are better off with international trade.  
Tirado, et al.. (2004) illustrate the gains from voluntary water rights exchange between 
the agriculture and urban sectors. Agricultural production is lower when there is a market for 
water rights than when there is not such a market. Tirado et. al.. (2005) introduce Water 
Framework Directive to the same model, while Tirado et. al.. (2006) analyze the effect of 
efficiency of irrigation on tourism sector and they conclude that water efficiency measures do 
not reduce economic pressures on water ecosystems. 
CGE models have also been used to analyze the impact of water policies on equity and 
poverty alleviation. Letsoalo et. al.. (2005) test the triple dividend hypothesis discussed in 
section 3.2.  They concluded that there could be a triple dividend of water policy that would 
simultaneously reduce water scarcity, improve economic growth and reduce poverty. 
Velazquez et. al.. (2007) develop the models of Cardenete and Sancho (2003) and André et. 
al.. (2005) to assess the impact of various of water tax policies. They concluded that although 
the tax policy does not yield significant water saving in the agricultural sector, a more 
efficient and more rational reallocation of water is achieved.  
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Briand (2004) introduces the competition between irrigation and drinking water to a 
CGE model. Boccanfuso et al. (2005) concluded that price changes have different general 
equilibrium effects and winners and losers depend on these effects.  
There has been limited research that combines both micro and macro aspects of policy 
interventions for improving irrigation water allocation. Roe et. al. (2005) use both top-down 
(trade reform) and bottom-up (farm water assignments and the possibility of water trading) 
linkages . They concluded that trade reform (top-bottom or macro to micro linkage) has a 
higher effect compared to water reform (bottom-up or micro to macro linkage). They also 
conclude that the sequencing of reforms is also important in determining the final effect. 
There have been attempts in the literature to combine CGE models with other types of 
models in the analysis of water policies. Finoff (2004) introduces a bio-economic model 
based on general equilibrium approach.  Smajgl et. al  (2005) integrates theoretically agent-
based modeling with a CGE model.  
The complexity caused by the interrelationship between economic, cultural, social and 
political phenomena all related to water makes it impossible to write a prescription that will 
cure all problems about water issues. Better water management is certainly possible only with 
the introduction of better tools to measure and to plan water demand and supply. Economic 
models are attempts to fulfill this objective. In this paper we attempted to give a survey of 
recent work in economics literature and to shed light on the viewpoints of economists. Water 
has entered economic models only very recently. Thus, it may be fair to state that economics 
is in its infancy regarding water issues.  
The models discussed in this survey have important deficiencies. Firstly, most of them 
lack the implementation of different pricing methods. As discussed earlier, the water policy is 
crucially dependent on the way water is priced.  The second most important issue, is the fact 
that uncertainty due to climate change  has not been incorporated into CGRE models yet this 
affects water availability. Uncertainty also has a significant effect on the behavior of 
economic agents. Thirdly, it is possible to incorporate market failures in the CGE models. As 
mentioned afore, market failures are at the core of the water policy since they are the basis of 
government intervention.  
Consequently, there are still uncovered topics and regions. More effort needs to be 
devoted to research about economic modeling of water to produce policies that will pave the 
way for sustainable development.
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